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Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that Bitcoin, and cryptocurrencies more generally, is an important and 
distinctive information infrastructure that warrants substantive study by organizational 
scholars.   The Bitcoin system is briefly described and the particular methodological 
challenges involved in studying the phenomenon are also discussed.  We assert that neither of 
the two broad conceptualisations of information infrastructures found in the literature—top-
down and bottom-up—help us in understanding Bitcoin.  Instead, Bitcoin is better understood 
as a form of game and we draw on the ludology literature and the case material to identify its 
game dimensions.  Bitcoin is a particular type of game, and we introduce the term Klein 
Bottle Game to describe this type of game.  A Klein bottle a one-sided, non-orientable surface 
that has no boundary.   We then describe the main features of Klein bottle games. First, they 
are different from most games in that the boundaries between the game and non-game worlds 
are not decipherable.  Second, we use the term Klein Portal to describe the particular set of 
practices that link the Klein Bottle Game that is Bitcoin to other infrastructures.  Third, we 
argue that Bitcoin exhibits many of the features of the carnivalesque—hence we speak of the 
crypto-carnivalesque—in that it is a site where norms and structures are temporarily 
suspended, conventional authority is contested, and autonomy if favoured over heteronomy.  
Fourth, Bitcoin is a site of ironic inversion, in that the ideology that drove Bitcoin’s initial 
development shows signs of now being inverted.  We conclude by noting the distinctive 
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nature of Bitcoin and caution against extending our analysis to other instances of information 
infrastructures. 
Keywords: information infrastructure, ethnography, Bitcoin, carnivalesque, Klein bottle. 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, we argue that cryptocurrencies—Bitcoin being the exemplar—are an emerging 
(information) infrastructure that warrants sustained study by organizational scholars.1  
Cryptocurrencies are significant, not only as a new form of money, but also because they will 
probably be foundational to digital modes of organizing, and, as an infrastructure, will be 
taken-for-granted and hence unseen in years to come. We argue that our understanding of 
infrastructures can be deepened through studying Bitcoin, while, conversely, our 
understanding of Bitcoin (and even monies more broadly) can be enriched by seeing it as an 
infrastructure.  In particular, we highlight the carnivalesque nature of Bitcoin which we posit 
is an invisible but crucial aspect of digital infrastructural innovation that is overlooked by 
conventional approaches to the study of infrastructures. 
The paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we introduce Bitcoin and the 
blockchain technology on which it is based. Then, we outline the theoretical frame that 
informs our research and our methodology. We then introduce the idea that Bitcoin may be 
understood as a “Klein bottle game”. We explain what this concept means and we describe 
and illustrate five features of the Klein bottle game that is Bitcoin.  We then discuss the wider 
relevance of the case and conclude by pointing to possible future lines of inquiry. 
A brief introduction to Bitcoin 
Bitcoin2 is easily the best-known and the first widely used form of “digital money” or 
cryptocurrency.  While the first bitcoin transaction only occurred in 2009, it is the 
culmination of decades of research into cryptography and distributed systems. As 
Antonopolous (2014) explains, it consists of four key innovations brought together in a 
unique way: 
                                                
1 Throughout this text we use cryptocurrency, digital money and digital currencies as synonyms. These terms 
refer to native digital currencies, such as bitcoin, and not to the digital version of fiat monies, such as the euro, 
dollar, pound, etc. We use the term “Bitcoin” to refer to the overall Bitcoin network, while “bitcoin” refers to 
digital money produced by this network. 
2 We use the term “Bitcoin” to refer to the overall Bitcoin network, while “bitcoin” refers to digital money 
produced by this network. For a good history of Bitcoin to date, see Popper (2015), while see Antonopoulos 
(2014) for a detailed description of how it works.  
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• A decentralized peer-to-peer network (the bitcoin protocol) 
• A public transaction ledger (the blockchain) 
• A decentralized mathematical and deterministic currency issuance protocol 
(distributed mining) 
• A decentralized transaction verification system (transaction script) 
The seminal contribution to the phenomenon was by the mysterious individual or group 
known as Satoshi Nakamoto, who published a paper that set out the basis for the 
“blockchain” on which cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and other possible services are based 
(Nakamoto, 2008). Nakamoto began his paper with an imaginary world populated by 
trustless individuals, and the problem he addresses is how to enable trustworthy transactions 
on the Internet—where there is not a fixed and known population—without recourse to a 
trusted third party such as a state-regulated (or state-supported) bank. His solution is the 
blockchain, which is a public record or ledger of all transactions maintained by a dispersed 
and open-ended number of “miners”, who provide computing power to guarantee the ledger’s 
integrity. The blockchain uses cryptography to create an infrastructure through which 
transactions are certified without recourse to a trusted third party, such as a bank. Bitcoin is 
then usable by whoever installs a “wallet” on a digital device, there being no form of identity 
check at access points. Hence, Bitcoin is a purely digital cryptocurrency that is not directly 
administered by any constituted organization and is not circumscribed within any consistent 
jurisdiction.  
Bitcoin is built around scarcity (money cannot be infinite) and absence (no guarantor) and, 
unlike traditional currencies, it is not linked to precious metals, nor to a state (fiat money), 
nor to credit (banks). Nakamoto’s main architectural innovation is the blockchain which is 
designed to make it impossible to either double-spend money—which would create 
immediate infinite inflation—or for a unique central authority to rule.  
Nakamoto’s attempt to create a money system without a central authority can be situated at 
the intersection of diachronic and synchronic issues. Historically, the blockchain is part of a 
long chain of information technologies that, since the 1960s, have avoided centralization 
tenaciously, partly as a defense against possible Soviet nuclear attack, and partly in sympathy 
with the Western liberal culture of the 1960s and 1970s. By eluding consolidated control 
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points and circumventing the consistency of jurisdictions, cryptocurrencies work to weaken 
some of the theoretical and political strands of social order derived from states. From a more 
monetary viewpoint, these views echo Hayek’s (1976/1990) argument that money should be 
denationalized and privatized.  Rather than describing the phenomenon further—more detail 
is readily available on the Internet3—we will now proceed to outline the theoretical frame 
that informs our research.  
Theoretical frame 
While the call for papers alludes to different types of infrastructure, our study is confined to 
Bitcoin which we see as an instantiation of an information infrastructure.  This particular case 
is interesting because we are witnessing an infrastructure being put in place, before it 
becomes blackboxed and invisible.  Within the literature, two broad conceptualisations of 
information infrastructures can be identified: one that sees them as manageable assets, 
amenable to top-down control and requiring a clear IT governance framework (for instance, 
Weill and Ross (2004)), while another approach argues that the absolute control of 
information infrastructures is impossible, that deviation from original intentions and 
unintended consequences are commonplace in such contexts (for example, Ciborra (2000) ), 
and that it is better to conceptualise these heterogeneous socio-technical objects as complex 
adaptive systems that require “bottom-up” design and a “polycentric” form of governance 
(Constantinides and Barrett, 2015). Bitcoin provides a potentially interesting case where 
these two alternative approaches, and perhaps others, might be investigated.  But first we 
need to clarify that Bitcoin warrants being considered an information infrastructure at all.    
To address this issue, we first turn to Star and Ruhleder’s (1996) influential conceptualisation 
of an information infrastructure. Their idea builds on the common understanding of an 
infrastructure as something that is built and maintained, and which is at once ever-present and 
ready-to-hand, and yet sinks into the background and becomes completely transparent. They 
go beyond this understanding by emphasizing that an information infrastructure is a 
fundamentally relational concept that is always grounded in particular practices; for instance, 
the water system is a piece of infrastructure for a chef cooking dinner, but it is something 
quite different for a city water engineer. Hence, the issue for Star and Ruhleder (1996) is as 
                                                
3 The website https://historyofbitcoin.org depicts a timeline of the phenomenon; https://bitcoin.org/, originally 
set up by Nakamoto and Martti Malmi, is a resource that supports the development of Bitcoin; the Bitcoin 
Foundation (https://bitcoinfoundation.org) is an organization dedicated to advancing Bitcoin; Coindesk 
(http://www.coindesk.com/) is a news site specializing in bitcoin and digital currencies, while blockchain.info 
(https://blockchain.info/) presents information from the blockchain, such as pool statistics. 
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much about when—rather than what—is an infrastructure. For them, infrastructures are 
characterized by a number of dimensions.  
1. They are “sunk” into other structures, social arrangements and technologies 
(embeddeness).  
2. They do not have to be reinvented with each task (transparency).  
3. They reach beyond a single event or one-site practice (scope).  
4. They are learned as part of membership of a community of practice.  
5. They shape and are shaped by the conventions of a community of practice.  
6. They plug into other infrastructures and tools in a standard way.  
7. They are built on an installed base.  
8. They become visible upon breakdown.  
Hence, “an infrastructure occurs when local practices are afforded by a larger-scale 
technology, which can then be used in a natural, ready-to-hand fashion. It becomes 
transparent as local variations are folded into organizational changes, and becomes an 
unambiguous home—for somebody” (1996, p. 114, our emphasis). Bowker and Star (1999) 
also show how such infrastructures are scaffolded by important classification systems, such 
as the International Classification of Diseases or the Nursing Interventions Classification.  
Bitcoin is generally considered a form of money (though some dispute this) and so we will 
first consider the idea that money is an information infrastructure.  Money does seem to 
exhibit all eight characteristics identified by Star and Ruhleder. It is certainly deeply 
embedded in other social arrangements, structures and technologies (1); it does not have to be 
reinvented with each task (2); it reaches beyond single events or one-site practices (3); as a 
technology, it is learned—from an early age—through membership of a community (4); it is 
performative in that a community’s collective belief that some pieces of paper are “money” is 
sustained and validated by the practices that inform that belief, while, at the same time, the 
belief self-referentially enables and sustains these practices (5); it inserts itself into other 
infrastructures (e.g. an ERP) in a standard way (6); the creation of the euro out of separate 
currency systems in 1999 is a good example of money being built on an installed base (7); 
while Greece’s potential exit from the euro system in 2015 is a good example of money, as 
an infrastructure, only becoming visible upon threat of breakdown (8). Indeed, money is 
perhaps the example par excellence of something that is in plain sight—we see it everywhere 
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around us—while at the same time it is invisible, in that we routinely do not think about it as 
a constructed piece of infrastructure. If money is a form of information infrastructure, then so 
too is digital money, specifically Bitcoin, which is the empirical focus of our study. 
To deepen the analysis, we briefly examine how Bitcoin maps on to another influential, if 
somewhat competing, conceptualisation of an infrastructure, namely Hanseth and Lyytinen’s 
(2010) highly cited definition of an information infrastructure as “a shared, open (and 
unbounded), heterogeneous, and evolving socio-technical system…consisting of a set of IT 
capabilities and their user, operations, and design communities” (p. 4, original emphasis).   
Bitcoin is shared as it is available to anyone with an internet connection.  It is open in that 
anyone can transact in bitcoin, the underlying code is open-source, while the blockchain 
itself, as a public ledger, can be considered a public good.  It is heterogeneous in that it 
contains different actors, including miners, coders, transactors, regulators, exchanges, as well 
as different applications and platforms, such as different altcoins (alternatives to bitcoin), 
sidechains, and is the basis for other infrastructures such as Ethereum and the Lightning 
network.  It is rapidly evolving: initially, personal computers were used to “mine” bitcoin, but 
because success in mining is linked to computing power, dedicated mining hardware was 
quickly developed to the point where large mining “farms” have now been built in locations 
with cheap electricity.  Likewise, the constellation of services and applications that sit on the 
blockchain network is ever-increasing and evolving.4  Many have predicted that Bitcoin will 
die, but even if it does it will almost certainly be replaced by an alternative cryptocurrency 
embedded in a new variant of the blockchain technology.  At the same time, the Bitcoin 
protocol is essentially the same as originally set out in Nakamoto’s original white paper 
which continues to provide the infrastructure’s overarching ideology, structure and standard. 
Continuing our initial analysis, it is also worth considering whether Bitcoin is better 
understood as an information infrastructure or a platform.  For Hanseth and Lyytinen (2010), 
examples of platforms include office software platforms (e.g., MS Office), operating system 
platforms (e.g., Windows, Linux), application frameworks like ERP (e.g., SAP, Oracle), or 
application development platforms (e.g., Service Oriented Architecture).  They distinguish 
platforms from information infrastructures in that the organising principle of the former is 
“direct” composition, while the latter are recursively organized—meaning they return “onto” 
                                                
4 A recent report by the World Economic Forum (2016) indicates that 80% of banks are predicted to initiate 
blockchain projects in 2017, that over 2500 patents relating to the blockchain have been lodged since 2012, and 
that venture capitalists have invested over $1.4 billion in blockchain-related businesses over the last three years.
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themselves through being composed of similar elements—and they are at once the outcome 
and condition of design action.  While control is centralized in platforms, it is distributed and 
dynamically negotiated in information infrastructures.  Based on this distinction, Bitcoin—
and the blockchain technology in which it is embedded—is better understood as an 
information infrastructure rather than a platform.  Bitcoin is a quintessentially distributed 
system, designed to resist centralisation—though some centralisation has emerged in mining 
pools, for example—while changes to the open source software must be dynamically 
negotiated among the user community.  Bitcoin is also recursively organised, though 
autopoietic organisation might be a better-known term. Maturana and Varela (1973/1980) 
define an autopoietic machine as: 
a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production 
(transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and 
transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) 
that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in 
which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization 
as such a network. (p. 78) 
An autopoietic machine (or system) may be usefully compared with an allopoietic system, 
such as a bicycle factory, which makes organized structures (bicycles) each one being 
something other than itself (the factory). In contrast, Bitcoin is an autopoietic system in that 
it works to recreate and extend itself. For instance, the bitcoin generated by the Bitcoin 
system (machine) are at the same time a rewarding scheme for miners and a currency for 
other users. Also, the essence of the blockchain technology is that it ensures that each copy of 
the blockchain is identical, no matter how many copies are created and how big the network 
becomes. Variants of the blockchain (known as forks) are quickly weeded out through a 
proof-of-work process that authenticates one, and only one, blockchain. 
Before progressing with our analysis, we need to say something about the methodological 
issues involved in studying information infrastructures and the particular approach we took 
and the choices we made in this research.  
Studying Information Infrastructures 
Building on her earlier work with Ruhleder, Star (1999) considered some of the 
methodological challenges facing those interested in studying infrastructures. Her work is 
situated within the broader tradition of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which is—as its 
founders repeatedly claim—a methodological lens to study the social and the technical to 
understand how particular (sociomaterial) orders come to be. It is primarily a method of 
inquiry in the ethnomethodological tradition, although it distinguishes itself from 
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ethnomethodology by trying not to privilege humans, consciousness or pre-existing 
structures, either methodologically or theoretically. To begin, she cautions against the 
traditional ethnographic focus on talk, community, identity and group processes, mediated by 
information technology. Instead, she argues that any study of infrastructure requires that 
attention be paid to the most diverse and mundane things, like plugs, standards, bureaucratic 
forms, or debates about issues like domain names and exchange protocols. These may be 
boring, but they are nonetheless tremendously important if we want to study that which is 
embedded. She poses pertinent methodological questions: How does one study action at a 
distance? When is an infrastructure finished? How would we know that? What values and 
ethical principles do we inscribe in information environments? She suggests that paradoxes 
should not be overlooked, but rather should be used as entry points to develop the empirical 
work. And if infrastructure is a fundamentally relational concept, then it only becomes real in 
relation to organized practices and hence these practices should become central to any study. 
In particular, Star foregrounds questions of scale, given that infrastructures are routinely 
constituted by groups distributed geographically and temporally, often involving hundreds of 
people, large quantities of materiel and precious few self-contained ethnographic sites. Such 
issues probably require new methods, and indeed the absence of these might help explain 
why Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies have received such scant attention from information 
systems scholars thus far.  
Previous research experience on information infrastructures and monies had given us a tacit 
but clear understanding of the usual strengths and limitations of the qualitative researcher’s 
toolkit. Being aware of the challenges involved in studying digital monies, we approached 
this study in a somewhat novel way. While Star warns of the inherent limitations of focusing 
on a community as a proxy for studying a whole infrastructure, we decided to create a 
community of interest about this infrastructure so to be able to cover and discuss more 
aspects than we could on ourselves, and consider the most diverse views. This team building 
exercise was started around a small and simple research project intercepting the zeitgeist of 
its time: a two-pager written in the aftermath of the second Greek crisis, in early 2013, that 
proposed comparing emerging currencies, especially digital, at a time when the Euro seemed 
to be cracking at its edges. Creating a community around this research interest is not 
something that can be exhaustively described here. However, the focus was always on 
understanding the emerging phenomenon of cryptocurrencies through engaging with the 
practices and practitioners involved.  In this sense, we were informed by some of the tenets of 
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grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1968) in that we tried not to impose prior theoretical 
frames onto the phenomenon, but were more interested in the interpretations, practices and 
encoded values of different actors within Bitcoin.  To this end, we collected and read a large 
number of related documents, academic works, contributions to seminars and conferences, 
and we also continually trawled through and extracted from specialized press and online fora. 
Concretely, from January 2013 to the present, we systematically read, shared and discussed 
Bitcoin blogs and forums, online videos, mainstream news, Wikipedia and academic articles 
and books about Bitcoin and the blockchain, as well as dedicated sites such as bitcoin.org and 
coindesk.com, news feeds like cryptocoinsnews.com, and numerous websites of 
organizations and businesses operating in the bitcoin space. Beyond our mailing list and 
shared file repository, we ran a one-day conference on “gaming money” in May 2015 (63 
registered participants, mostly academics, plus 90 online and 140 views of online 
videorecordings) and a “World Café” in April 2016 on the theme of “translating the 
blockchain” (35 participants, mainly from industry). We also set up a website (at around 
1,000 visitors per month) and a twitter account with its own bot (stably above 50,000 
impressions per month). We collected and reviewed the original “white papers” that 
documented the technical basis for the main cryptocurrencies including Bitcoin, Ripple, 
Ethereum, and eighteen other altcoins. Over the years, our mailing list and shared file 
repository emerged as instruments for updating and sensemaking about digital monies among 
up to eighty people from very different walks of life and expertise (academics from disparate 
disciplines and continents, practitioners, programmers, activists, students). A number of this 
group’s members have been directly active in the Bitcoin environment, and thus might be 
considered participant observers. This is important because, unlike other phenomena of 
interest to social scientists, which may have an online dimension, the core activities of 
cryptocurrencies actually happen online. The digital environment is where the action 
happens. Indeed, in understanding infrastructures as they happen, we have been helped by the 
fact that crucial Bitcoin matters are publicly discussed online. This is for two main reasons: 
first, free and open source software matters are by definition discussed openly and publicly 
via digital means; and, second, cryptocurrencies have not yet become part of common praxes 
and so they have not slipped into the taken-for-grantedness, typical of established 
infrastructures.  Hence, our longitudinal study is aligned with the actor-network interest in 
studying how things “come to be”, before becoming black-boxed.  This is important in 
seeking to understand the nature of an information infrastructure, but it seems especially 
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important that we study the emergence of a new form of money, given how intrinsic money is 
to social life (Simmel, 1900/2004; Zelizer, 1997; Hart, 2000; Dodd, 2014). 
While our observations and data about “Bitcoin in the wild” and related phenomena were 
certainly not confined to this group, the conversations continuously helped put happenings 
into perspective, including those disagreements that indicated that different communities 
were represented within this community and encountering one another. This community of 
interest worked to effect what Bowker (1994) calls an “infrastructural inversion”—i.e. 
infrastructures, which tend to be backgrounded, become foregrounded—in the continuous 
recombination and interpretations of document analyses, technical novelties, breaking news 
(Bitcoin routinely hit the headlines), court cases, automatic feeds, social media, conference 
and public presentations, etc.  Even if “qualitative research, combined with a historical 
emphasis on single investigator studies, has never lent itself to ethnography of thousands” 
(Star, 1999, p. 383), our community-technical arrangement reduced the input to a manageable 
volume. So, while we cannot claim that our data collection is all-inclusive—due to the sheer 
scale of the phenomenon—the continuous data selection operated by the diverse news sites 
we read and the online communities we participated in, refined our interpretations and made 
them, we feel, reasonably reliable. Conversely, the large amount of longitudinal data, shared 
in our repository of documents, fed into academic and also public discourse through our 
presence in specialized gatherings and outlets.  
Our analysis, led by the authors and discussed within and beyond the research project was 
iterative, reflexive and, in as much as it could be, robust. Given the sheer quantity of data, as 
well as our sense that qualitative analysis software is most suited to the constant comparative 
method—which wasn’t appropriate to our study—we did not use software to help code or 
analyze the dataset. Rather, throughout this long process, we developed themes based on our 
study of the phenomenon, which we discussed among ourselves, with our colleagues and in 
reputed international academic gatherings, being careful that there was plenty of evidence 
illustrating each theme, though we were also mindful that a complex, global, and in many 
ways inscrutable phenomenon like Bitcoin is not easily reducible to themes or a theoretical 
model. In sum, constant triangulation of data from fora, blogs, social media and specialised 
news proved effective for our research group and extended community of interest to make 
sense of what was going on and to cope with the difficulties of having a moving target as a 
research focus.  
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Bitcoin as Klein Bottle Game 
When one thinks of infrastructures one is unlikely to also think about games; infrastructures 
tend to be serious things—electricity networks, health information systems, ERP systems and 
the like—while games tend to be associated with children and trivial pursuits.  However, our 
research shows that the information infrastructure that is Bitcoin is fundamentally infused by 
the principles of game design and game playing (Kane, 2005; Schell, 2008), which 
necessarily impacts how it is organized, governed and governable. 
The first point to note is that Bitcoin is not just one game, but a multiplicity of games; games 
in—and on—games. For instance, it is a form of betting game, in that it is clear that many 
purchases of bitcoin are essentially speculative gambles that bitcoin’s value will increase into 
the future. Indeed, some—including the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission and 
the People’s Bank of China—see Bitcoin as a commodity or “digital asset” rather than a 
currency. And this is not a low-risk game as there is a real chance that the currency will 
totally collapse in value, not least because of the significant scalability issues that were 
recognized early in its development. A further feature of the gamble is that unlike bets on 
sporting events, which should not affect the result, bets on the value of a traded asset, 
whether this be a currency or a commodity, can be self-fulfilling since such bets can affect 
perceptions on which present and future values are based.  
The game aspect of Bitcoin is also obvious when we consider bitcoin mining, which has two 
distinct betting dimensions. First, like others who hold or trade in bitcoins, miners are taking 
a gamble that bitcoin will continue to hold its value. However, there is also a second betting 
aspect peculiar to the practice of mining. Specifically, mining is designed as a competitive 
game as it is based on a series of “rounds” in which miners compete with one another to find 
a “proof-of-work,” with the winner obtaining a prize (a bitcoin).5 This is very much a game 
of chance, in that “proof-of-work”, which underpins the technology, is akin to throwing a pair 
of dice repeatedly until a highly unlikely series of numbers appears. From the miners’ 
perspective, Bitcoin is essentially a reward scheme for the computing power they provide to 
those who trade in or with bitcoin. The blockchain, then, is just the record of past rounds and 
continually lengthens as the game progresses, akin to an ever-growing chain of domino tiles.  
                                                
5 Games are commonly used in cryptographic security proofs (Bellare and Rogaway, 2006).  For example, in his 
original white paper, Nakamoto simulated an attack on his proposed system by a “dishonest” player, which he 
framed as a variation on the Gambler’s Ruin problem.  His analysis indicated that his proposed Bitcoin 
protocol/game would incentivize a dishonest player to “play by the rules” (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 4).   
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In The Art of Game Design, Schell (2008) makes an important distinction between the game 
designer and the player, and this distinction also applies to Bitcoin (and perhaps to other 
infrastructures). Most obviously, Nakamoto was the game’s primary designer and the original 
design is largely mapped out in his/her/their seminal white paper (Nakamoto, 2008) which 
now has mythical status within much of the Bitcoin community. Nakamoto also wrote the 
original code and released the first version of the game in 2009, and was also one of the 
earliest players, which is consistent with game design where game designers typically refine 
the game through repeated playing. 
Bitcoin’s game ethic draws on and echoes a wider ludic shift in the zeitgeist. The ludology 
literature is very much a recent phenomenon—notwithstanding the earlier contributions by 
Huizinga (1955) and Caillois (1961)—with almost all academic journals appearing since 
2000: Game Studies (2001), Game Developer (2001), Gaming Research & Review Journal 
(2002), Games & Culture (2006), and Eludamos: Journal for Computer Game Culture 
(2007). The video game industry, which did not even exist 40 years ago, enjoyed estimated 
revenues of $102 billion in 2015 and is now larger than the film industry, with 63% of US 
households having at least one person who plays video games regularly (at least 3 hours per 
week) (Entertainment Software Association, 2016). The principal web forum for board 
games, boardgamegeek.com, founded in 2000, now claims to have a database of over 76,000 
games, and one million registered users. Similarly, there is a rapidly growing collection of 
books on games (Juul, 2005; Salen and Zimmerman, 2006; Schell, 2008; Järvinen, 2009; 
Elias et al., 2012; Woods, 2012) but there are very few books about games published before 
2000.  
It is therefore no surprise that the emergence of Bitcoin is concomitant to this wider interest 
in games. For instance, in his valuable study of the Bitcoin story, Popper posits that many of 
the youngsters who were attracted to Bitcoin in the early years (2009–2011) liked the card 
game Magic because it required “unexpected solutions to complex problems” (Popper, 2015, 
p. 94). One such Magic enthusiast and designer of online games was Jed McCaleb, who set 
up the infamous Mt. Gox bitcoin exchange in 2010. Indeed, McCaleb originally purchased 
the domain name mtgox.com because he wanted to create a website for users of Magic: The 
Gathering online service (mtgox is short for Magic: The Gathering Online eXchange), and he 
also used the domain name to advertise another online game that he designed, called The Far 
Wild. Moreover, the ethos of playing is also evident in his comment that he “created mtgox 
on a lark” and that it “has been interesting and fun to do” (McCaleb, 2011). Likewise, in 
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2012, Eric Voorhees, another prominent figure in the Bitcoin community, set up a gambling 
website that uses bitcoin, called SatoshiDice (after Satoshi Nakamoto), and which was a 
game of odds based on the same hash functions and mathematics as Bitcoin. He sold the site 
a year later for over $12 million.  
Board games like Monopoly are competitive, but a growing number of cooperative board 
games have become popular in recent years—coinciding with the spread of Bitcoin—such as 
Pandemic (2007), Space Alert (2009), Sentinels of the Multiverse (2011), Freedom: The 
Underground Railroad (2013).6 Bitcoin is a competitive game, in that the miners compete 
with one another, but it is also a cooperative game in that coalitions of players in pools are 
allowed, and the miners are also incentivized, through the game’s design, to work together to 
ensure that the “game” is not hijacked by a greedy attacker who may subvert the rules to their 
advantage and double-spend their money.  
Indeed, the risk that the rules of the game will be subverted and changed—which is all but 
unthinkable since there is no access control—marks Bitcoin as different from other games 
like tennis, football and chess where everyone knows who is playing.  Bitcoin is a game, but 
a particular and different type of game, and so we introduce the metaphor of the Klein bottle 
to capture these differences. In mathematics, a “Klein bottle” is a one-sided, non-orientable 
surface which a traveler can traverse but will eventually be flipped upside down on returning 
to the original starting point. It is a three-dimensional version of the better known Möbius 
strip and can be formed by joining two Möbius strips along their boundaries (see figure 1). 
 
                                                
6 In August 2016, Wikipedia listed 742 cooperative video games 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cooperative_video_games) 
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Figure 1. A Möbius strip (above) and a Klein bottle (bottom) 
We find the metaphor of a Klein bottle more appropriate than a Möbius strip because while 
the latter is a surface with a boundary, a Klein bottle has no boundary: its inside is its outside. 
The metaphor is useful because it describes important aspects of Bitcoin that distinguish it 
from other types of games. Specifically, we see Bitcoin as a Klein bottle game, which has the 
following features. 
1. The boundaries of a Klein bottle game are indecipherable. 
2. Klein bottle games plug into other information infrastructures through “Klein 
portals” 
3. Klein bottle games are digital versions of the carnivalesque 
4. Paradoxical inversions are a feature of Klein bottle games, making them a space 
of difference, otherness and ambiguity  
Indecipherable boundaries 
There is a long discussion in the play literature on the idea that play is an “autotelic” activity, 
which is an activity engaged in solely for its own sake, with no meaning exterior to itself or 
ulterior motive outside of its own terms of reference. This idea goes back to Huizinga, who 
saw play as “an act apart”, separated by a “magic circle” from “ordinary life” (1955, p. 10, 
13), a point picked up by Caillois (1961, p. 10) who saw games as “separate”. Similarly, 
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Schell (2008, p. 34) includes the idea of the game as a “closed formal system” within his 10 
“game qualities”, while in the computer games literature Crawford (1984, p. 7) asserts that: 
a game is a closed formal system that subjectively represents a subset of reality… By 
“closed” I mean that the game is complete and self-sufficient as a structure. The model 
world created by the game is internally complete; no reference need be made to agents 
outside of the game.  
Others disagree, with Woods arguing that “board game systems are anything but closed” and 
that “a particular game can offer a vastly different experience depending upon the context in 
which it is played” (Woods, 2012, p. 6). Similarly, Juul argues that the boundaries between 
the game and real worlds are “fuzzy areas under constant negotiation” (Juul, 2005`: 36). 
Here, the reasoning is that games are akin to fairy-tales in that they bring the player/reader 
into what Tolkien (1966/1983) describes as a “Second World” which is both consistent and 
rational, and which provides a unique and insightful perspective on the “Primary World”. 
Moreover, the primary and secondary worlds are not separate but mutually constitutive as 
understandings, principles and values interpenetrate between them. As Tolkien put it, the 
point of fairy stories, such as the frog princess story, “lies not in thinking frogs [as] possible 
mates, but in the necessity of keeping promises (even those with intolerable consequences) 
that, together with observing prohibitions, runs through all Fairyland” (Tolkien, 1966/1983, 
p. 152–3). Even the simplest games, like Snakes & Ladders, help frame and construct our 
understanding of concepts such as ambition, purpose, competition, failure, chance, turn-
taking, beginnings and endings. 
However, the Bitcoin story shows and requires a third way of thinking about games. Bitcoin 
is neither an autotelic activity—a closed formal system, separate from ordinary life—nor is it 
a moral tale, akin to a fantasy story, because both of these require a distinction between the 
game and “ordinary life” (or the secondary and primary worlds in Tolkien’s language). In the 
case of Bitcoin, we do not find such a distinction compelling since it is premised on a clear 
delineation of boundaries. What we see in the Bitcoin story is that putative boundaries are 
inevitably elusive and/or easily transgressed. For instance, initially there were very few 
people (or computers) involved in the Bitcoin network, and it was relatively easy to join the 
network and gain bitcoins, not least because it was designed to easily expand, through, for 
example, making the source code open. Now, miners drop in and out of the network and it is 
never clear or known who is in—or is not in—the mining game. At the time of writing, large 
mining pools are operating but their extent, location, make-up and resources are largely 
unknown. And, again largely by design, neither the extent of the network nor the identity nor 
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number of “players” is easily reckonable. Most obviously, Nakamoto’s identity was and is 
unknown to this day. Also, applications of all sorts keep springing up. Akin to chasing a 
leprechaun or the end of a rainbow, once one thinks one has identified a boundary the game 
changes. And without a boundary, it makes no sense to consider Bitcoin an autotelic system, 
nor does it make much sense to delineate the primary and secondary worlds. And this is why 
the metaphor of the Klein bottle is helpful: it has no boundary.  
Klein Portals 
Bitcoin’s boundaries are inherently difficult to identify partly because it is an infrastructure—
albeit a nascent one—and infrastructures are axiomatically “sunk” into other structures, 
social arrangements and technologies. However, this “sinking” needs to be effected, which is 
not easily achievable. For instance, even though the notion of digital money had been 
discussed at least as far back as 1997, and Nakamoto has published his paper in August 2008, 
releasing the first version of the software in January 2009, it was May 2010 before bitcoins 
were used to purchase an actual “real world” item—specifically a pizza. What was effected in 
this watershed moment was what we will call a “Klein Portal” as it enabled the Bitcoin 
system (which we are characterizing as a Klein bottle game) to link with other infrastructures, 
namely those infrastructures that allow the production and distribution of pizzas. Of course 
the Bitcoin system already had material elements—hardware, desks, people, etc.—but what 
was different about the pizza purchase was that it effected an important feature of Bitcoin as 
infrastructure—i.e. it plugged Bitcoin into other infrastructures in a standard way (the sixth of 
Star and Ruhleder’s characteristics of infrastructures). Even before that celebrated pizza was 
purchased for 10,000 bitcoins (worth over €20million at 2017 valuation), a bitcoin currency 
exchange, Bitcoin Market, was already established (in February 2010) which enabled bitcoin 
to be traded for other currencies. While this was very small beer—and bitcoin currency 
exchange remains relatively small—it provided a link into a very large and robust network of 
currency exchange markets. Thus the Bitcoin Market constituted another Klein portal. 
In linking a Klein bottle game with an existing information infrastructure, Klein Portals can 
become a site of advantage within the game or indeed the new practices that constitute the 
Portal may work to redefine the rules of the game. At the same time, and because a Klein 
bottle game is a dynamic game with no boundaries, Portals are also ready targets for 
subversion and sites of transgression. This happened with the main bitcoin exchange, Mt 
Gox, which was launched in 2010 and was, by 2013, handling 70% of all bitcoin transactions 
(Vigna, 2014). Mt. Gox was a Klein Portal in that it linked Bitcoin with other information 
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infrastructures, in this case the system of currency exchange markets. In 2011 Mt. Gox was 
silently hacked, causing the company to collapse 3 years later with the loss of some 850,000 
bitcoins, worth more than $450 million at the time. Another example of a Klein Portal is the 
infamous Silk Road marketplace, which was an online black market and the first modern 
darknet market. This website was launched in February 2011 by Ross Ulbricht, a.k.a Dread 
Pirate Roberts, relying on the Tor network and bitcoin to allow users to anonymously 
purchase goods, typically illegal drugs. Again, what we find is the creation of a Klein Portal 
linking a Klein bottle game (Bitcoin) with other information infrastructures allowing an 
illegal drug market. Similar to Mt. Gox, this Portal proved to be fragile, and in 2013 the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Ulbricht and shut down the website. Two years later, 
Ulbricht was convicted of drugs trafficking, money laundering, computer hacking and 
running a criminal enterprise, and he is also due to stand trial for procuring executions. In his 
telling of the story, Popper observed how Ulbricht segued from the world of video games 
into, allegedly, ordering executions: “It was easy to image that Ross, cut off from any real 
contact with other members of the community, except for Internet chats, began to see people 
as abstractions with no real life force—like characters in a video game. In this sort of world, 
the idea of killing these people could lose its visceral repugnance” (Popper, 2015, p. 227). 
A Klein Portal links a Klein bottle game to other information infrastructures, though the 
nature of the Portal is reshaped as the practices on which it is based change. Moreover, the 
Klein Portal, as a set of practices, works to reshape the Klein bottle game itself, much like a 
tent is reshaped by driving tent-pegs—the metaphorical equivalent of Klein Portals—into the 
ground. Indeed, pegging a tent into the ground is a good metaphor for the way in which Klein 
Portals work to connect the “tent” that is a Klein bottle game with the “ground” (different 
infrastructures), or, from the other perspective, to see Bitcoin growing through leveraging 
other infrastructures. Infrastructures, such as the electricity network, are typically not Klein 
bottle games even though the concept might well have applied to them early in their 
evolution, as they are usually quite robust—if not immutable or indestructible—compared to 
the fragile Klein bottle game and its associated Klein Portals. Each Klein Portal works to 
reshape a Klein bottle game until eventually and cumulatively the latter may be reshaped to 
the point where it can no longer be considered a Klein bottle game. However, any such 
configuration is never permanent and, keeping with the metaphor, just as storms can pull a 
tent from its moorings, Klein Portals are always liable to fracture which can have catastrophic 
and dramatic consequences for the Klein bottle game.  
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Crypto-carnival 
Klein bottles are spaces that exhibit juxtaposition, ambiguity, otherness, difference, 
transgression, and dissimulation. All of these are phenomena associated with the 
carnivalesque, which we identify as the fourth attribute of Klein bottle games. The carnival 
has traditionally been a site where established norms and structures are temporarily 
suspended, where conventional authority is contested, and where autonomy is favored over 
heteronomy (Bakhtin, 1968/1984). Bitcoin is similar in that it is very much an explicit 
attempt to escape the existing social order where states and banks are dominant players, a 
theme we find expressed in a recent history of Bitcoin: The Age of Cryptocurrency: How 
Bitcoin and Digital Money is Challenging the Global Economic Order (Vigna and Casey, 
2015). In the carnival, things are often not what they appear to be; in place of truth and 
transparency, we find make-believe, pretense and dissimulation, epitomized in the carnival’s 
iconic image, the mask. Likewise in Bitcoin. Most obviously, the cryptocurrency emerged 
out of the cypherpunk movement which was dedicated to building anonymous systems on the 
Internet, including anonymous digital money (Lopp, 2016). The cypherpunks had an almost 
paranoid obsession with privacy and put huge effort into developing complex cryptographic 
systems that worked to create what are essentially “digital masks”. Consistent with this, the 
original and seminal Bitcoin white paper was written by a mysterious character or characters, 
Satoshi Nakamoto, whose identity remains unknown to this day. More broadly, the effect of 
the blockchain technology means that the identity of actors is unusually difficult to pin down. 
Cryptographic code, embedded in algorithms, works to coordinate and act across a 
distributed network of computers of unknown size and location, and where identifiable actors 
and identities are not readily constituted or identifiable. Thus, what Bitcoin has created is a 
phantasmatic world where there is action without actors, a ghostly world quite in keeping 
with the carnivalesque.   
In both the carnival and in Bitcoin, we find that this transgression of norms easily 
transgresses into illegal activity. In the carnival we find prostitution, cheating, stealing, 
fighting and gaming, while the best known instances of illegality in Bitcoin are the cases of 
Mt. Gox and Silk Road, while Liberty Reserve, which had over $8 billion of transactions, 
was another significant case of transgression involving digital money. Not surprisingly, 
authority has always found it difficult to deal with the carnivalesque. Bakhtin (1968/1984, p. 
109) suggests that the inversions of the carnival—such as a commoner acting as a king—are 
best seen as attempts by the lower orders to subvert and challenge the dominant social 
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hierarchy. Others have claimed that it is precisely because carnivals and fairs were sites of 
(potential) revolt that they were suppressed, especially in the nineteenth century (see Ó 
Maitiú (1995) for a description of the State and Church suppression of Donnybrook Fair), 
while there is also a view that the carnival was a location where social protest was licensed 
and thus controlled (Sales, 1983). In their study of the carnival in the nineteenth century, 
Stallybrass and White argue that the carnival provided the emerging bourgeoisie with a 
depiction of a profane Other, and encoded “all that which the proper bourgeois must strive 
not to be in order to preserve a stable and ‘correct’ sense of self” (Stallybrass and White, 
1986, p. 178). Hence, the carnival was both contained and sanctioned to ensure that this 
“sense of self” was maintained. We can detect a similar ambiguity with respect to how 
authority has responded to what might be depicted as a digital version of the carnivalesque: 
Bitcoin. Speaking at the BitFin conference in 2014, the Irish Central Bank’s Director of 
Markets Supervision, Gareth Murphy, urged the Bitcoin industry to “work actively to address 
the concerns of financial authorities rather than ‘playing cat and mouse’ and eventually, and 
inevitably, being drawn into the regulatory net” (Murphy, 2014). Yet, as of May 2017, the 
Irish Central Bank had made no official comment or taken any action on Bitcoin. More 
broadly, The Law Library of Congress, Global Research Center, in a 2014 survey of the 
regulation of Bitcoin in different jurisdictions, found that “the debate over how to deal with 
this new virtual currency is still in its infancy”. Two years later, the authorities continue to be 
tentative about Bitcoin, as illustrated by the title of de Filippi’s (2016) article, We must 
regulate Bitcoin. Problem is, we don’t understand it. At the same time, the elements of a 
regulatory structure are being put in place. In 2013, the New York State Department of 
Financial Services announced an interest in regulating it, as it subpoenaed the major Bitcoin 
players seeking information on their operations. Two years later, the same regulator 
introduced BitLicense, a business license for virtual currency activities, though this was soon 
challenged in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Other regulatory authorities have 
also been working to understand how best to engage with the phenomena, with the European 
Central Bank publishing reports on “virtual currency schemes” in 2012 and 2015 (European 
Central Bank, 2012; 2015), while the Bank of England is considering issuing its own digital 
currency (Danezis and Meiklejohn, 2015; Haldane, 2015; Small, 2016).  
In large part, the authorities have maintained a watching brief on Bitcoin, only engaging with 
the phenomenon when the transgressions are of significant size, as happened with Mt. Gox 
and Silk Road. Such tentativeness is understandable for two reasons. First, Bitcoin’s impact 
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on the economy is relatively small, and authorities have enough to be bothered about. 
Second, cryptocurrencies are difficult to understand, so effects of regulatory actions can be 
unpredictable. For instance, it is not clear if Bitcoin is a currency, a collective, a commodity, 
or a security. Its legal status is equally unclear: it might be a “chose in action” (i.e., a right to 
sue for possession or recovery of personal property, damages, or a debt) or a “chose in 
possession” (i.e. something in one’s actual possession) or it may be a “tertium quids” (a third 
something), a completely new class of private property (Bayern, 2014). If it is, then it only 
reinforces Bakthin’s (1968/1984) point that the carnival is a special, creative life-form.   
Thus, Bitcoin is what we might call a “crypto-carnival”. As such, it exhibits, but in a new 
form, the long-standing tension between the carnivalesque and authority, a tension that Tim 
May well anticipated when he wrote the crypto-anarchist manifesto in 1988: 
The State will of course try to slow or halt the spread of this technology, citing national 
security concerns, use of the technology by drug dealers and tax evaders, and fears of 
societal disintegration. Many of these concerns will be valid; crypto anarchy will allow 
national secrets to be traded freely and will allow illicit and stolen materials to be traded. 
An anonymous computerized market will even make possible abhorrent markets for 
assassinations and extortion. Various criminal and foreign elements will be active users of 
CryptoNet. But this will not halt the spread of crypto anarchy. (May, 1988) 
Ironic inversion/subversion 
If one travels on a straight line on the surface of a Klein bottle one can eventually return to 
the original starting point but be flipped upside down. This is a curious feature of the Klein 
bottle and one that we also see present in the Klein bottle game that is Bitcoin. Bitcoin 
emerged out of the cypherpunk movement which first surfaced in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, led by people like Tim May who sought to use technology, especially cryptography, to 
advance a political ideology centered on protecting privacy, countering mass surveillance, 
promoting individual liberty and freedom of expression, and fostering alternative financial 
and economic systems (May, 1988; 1994). As earlier as 1988, May (1988) and others were 
arguing that the power of the state, and to a lesser extent corporations, needed to be 
undermined:  
Just as the technology of printing altered and reduced the power of medieval guilds and 
the social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the nature 
of corporations and of government interference in economic transactions. Combined with 
emerging information markets, crypto anarchy will create a liquid market for any and all 
material which can be put into words and pictures. 
Some years later, the theme continued: 
Some of us believe various forms of strong cryptography will cause the power of the state 
to decline, perhaps even collapse fairly abruptly. We believe the expansion into 
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cyberspace, with secure communications, digital money, anonymity and pseudonymity, 
and other crypto-mediated interactions, will profoundly change the nature of economies 
and social interactions (May, 1994, §2.13.1).  
If May was talking abstractly about digital money, other cypherpunks were working to put 
the ideas into practice. For instance, Hal Finney, an active cypherpunk since the early 1990s, 
was instrumental in the early development of Bitcoin, having previously worked with Nick 
Szabo on an early form of digital money in the late 1990s.  He subsequently collaborated 
with Nakamoto, receiving the first bitcoin transaction from the latter in 2009. It is clear that 
Nakamoto also shared the cypherpunks’ libertarian distrust of “third parties”, be they 
governments or large corporations, and this distrust continues to be widely shared and 
articulated within the Bitcoin community. However, it is ironic that some 28 years after May 
predicted that “cryptologic methods [will] fundamentally alter the nature of corporations and 
of government interference in economic transactions” (May, 1988) it is still just a prediction, 
and indeed it is arguable that governments and large corporations are stronger than ever 
online.  
While governments have been tentative in seeking to regulate Bitcoin, the apparatus of the 
state has been quick to act when there is evidence of major fraud, as we have seen in the 
prosecution of individuals behind Mt. Gox, Silk Road, Liberty Reserve and GoldAge. For 
their part, larger corporations, while they were initially not engaged with Bitcoin, most likely 
because it was still relatively small, are now very active in appropriating and reworking the 
blockchain technology for their own benefit. For instance in 2016, Deloitte created a 
Blockchain Lab and announced five partnerships with blockchain startups (del Castillo, 
2016a); PwC partnered with two blockchain companies (del Castillo, 2016b); while Ernst & 
Young also invested in the space (Reed, 2016). The major challenge these businesses are 
addressing is how to use the blockchain technology and still meet anti-money-laundering 
(AML), know-your-customer (KYC) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) 
regulatory and legislative requirements. If they achieve this, then the technology will 
radically subvert Nakamoto’s original plan, which was to develop a system that ensured non-
mediated transactions. Moreover, the large corporates will almost certainly seek to use this to 
exclude new entrants from the financial services market, which will allow them to cement 
their dominant position in the market, which is again quite the opposite to what Nakamoto 
originally intended.  
Another example of this ironic inversion is that while Nakamoto designed the Bitcoin 
protocol as a decentralised system to exclude powerful third parties, what has actually 
 22 
happened is that mining has become centralised in very large mining pools. One indication of 
this is that by June 2016 just four mining pools controlled 69% of the mining market 
(https://blockchain.info/pools). The idea of the Klein bottle—where traversing the surface 
eventually flips one upside down—captures this paradox. What starts as an anti-statist and 
anti-corporation ideology works to support rather than undermine large organizations; a 
protocol that is designed to foster decentralization becomes centralized; while a technology 
developed by anti-establishment anarchists becomes appropriated by the Big Four accounting 
firms and large corporates.  
Final Remarks 
We began this paper by identifying two broad conceptualisations of information 
infrastructures: one that sees them as manageable assets amenable to “top-down” design and 
control, and another that advocates a “bottom-up” approach. Constantinides and Barrett 
(2015), in their study of the development of an integrated electronic healthcare record system 
in Greece, seek to address this “top-down/bottom-up” debate by advocating a “polycentric” 
form of governance, featuring multiple governing units at different scales, with “the nesting 
of governance into a broader network of institutions, in which governance is broken down 
into a series of layers” (p. 52). How does the Bitcoin case contribute to this discussion?  One 
important point is that “nesting” requires a hierarchical structure, with layers between a top 
and a bottom, and such a structure is not identifiable in Bitcoin. Instead, the structure of 
Bitcoin seems more akin to Engeström’s (2006) notion of mycorrhizae-like formations.  A 
mycorrhiza is a symbiotic association between a fungus and the roots or rhizoids of a plant, 
and is effectively invisible and difficult, if not impossible, to bound and close, though it is not 
indefinite.  For Engeström, the Linux community has these mycorrhizae-like attributes, and 
indeed we see a good deal of similarity between the Bitcoin and Linux communities.  While 
the concept of mycorrhizae is helpful, we prefer the notion of a Klein bottle game as it (a) 
foregrounds the ludic nature of the phenomenon; (b) captures the difficult-to-imagine idea of 
a boundary-less object; (c) incorporates the idea of action leading to inversion; and (d) it 
resonates with the concept of the crypto-carnivalesque.    
On this last point, there is long-standing link between the carnival and the market, as 
traditionally both were co-located in time and place. In the case of Bitcoin, the market is 
central in three respects: first, the Bitcoin infrastructure creates money (bitcoin) which is 
intrinsic to almost all markets; second, it creates a market for a particular form of money, 
bitcoin, as well as markets for all sorts of derivative products; and third, it is a market-making 
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technology, in so far as the blockchain technology is widely seen as a disruptive technology 
that will create new markets and destabilize industries (World Economic Forum, 2016). 
Bitcoin is a quite distinctive phenomenon—it may very well be sui generis—and so one 
should be careful in extending this analysis to other instances of information infrastructures. 
For instance, even though Bitcoin and Wikipedia both involve a community of actors and a 
shared infrastructure, they embody very different models of governing digital social 
production.  If Wikepedia is a “a community of dissensus” that facilitates and requires 
ongoing debate (Jemielniak, 2014, p. 84), Bitcoin is better understood as a manifestation of 
faceless consent, with the protocol ensuring that once a miner wins the competitive puzzle, 
and this is collectively notarized by the other miners, then the relevant block is added to the 
blockchain, which is then immutable.  This makes the blockchain a most interesting 
phenomenon.  In some ways, the blockchain is an example of the well-known concept of 
“boundary object”, which is something that is “both plastic enough to adapt to local needs 
and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a 
common identity across sites” (Star and Griesemer, 1989, p. 393).  At the same time, the 
sophisticated cryptographic protocol ensures that the blockchain is immutable, which makes 
it quite distinctive as an object.  It is designed to disallow multiple interpretations, and in that 
sense it is quite the opposite to a boundary object.  We might say that it is a boundary object 
and a boundaryless object—as is a Klein bottle.  This apparent paradox is in accord with the 
Klein bottle shape, in that moving on a Klein bottle literally turns things upside down. 
Bitcoin is also distinctive in that, in contrast to almost all other information infrastructures, 
neither a government, public body nor a large corporation were involved in its development. 
Unlike the 41 cases of information infrastructure listed by Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013), 
Bitcoin was developed by a loose network of individuals, who were not only not acting on 
behalf of a government, public body or large corporation, but indeed were involved in 
cryptocurrencies to undermine what they saw as the excessive power of these entities.  And 
while Constantinides and Barrett (2015) could identify six ideological positions in their study 
of the development of a health information infrastructure in Greece—based around different 
understandings of whether an infrastructure should be a public or a private good—it is clear 
that a single liberatarian ideology underpinned and was hegemonic in the development of 
Bitcoin. 
This libertarian ideology was articulated by a relatively homogenous group, notwithstanding 
its open and dispersed structure.  Here, Lustig and Nardi’s (2015) study of Bitcoin users is 
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revealing.  Of the 510 responses they received to a survey they posted on popular Bitcoin 
fora, 51% were American, 96% were male, 74% were atheist or agnostic, 60% were 
libertarian, and 50% were between the ages of 15 and 34.  Women are also singularly absent 
from Popper’s (2015) comprehensive history of the Bitcoin story: only five appear in the list 
of 126 individuals indexed in his book, and none of these played a significant part in the 
narrative.  
Information infrastructures are important and can have far-reaching and often unintended 
consequences.   In this paper we have analysed an iconic global monetary infrastructure that 
originated in libertarian values, is maintained by a game ethic, and now moves billions of 
dollars across jurisdictions.   We have introduced the concepts of the Klein bottle game and 
the crypto-carnivalesque as ways of understanding this distinctive and profoundly interesting 
pheneomenon.  Even if Bitcoin does not survive, it seems most likely that money will take on 
new forms in the digital society of the future, creating new challenges for how we live in and 
make sense of that world.   
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